likely to participate more only in those circumstances where they think they have a chance to help others.
We test our expectations using the "dictator" game (Forsythe et al. 1994) . In this game, subjects divide ten one dollar bills between themselves and an anonymous individual and the amount they donate is used as a measure of altruism. Subjects are then asked a number of questions regarding their socioeconomic status, political attitudes, support for humanitarian norms, and participation behavior. Previous studies have used this technique to study the relationship between altruism and participation (Dawes and Fowler 2007; Fowler 2006; Fowler and Kam 2007 ), but they have focused exclusively on student populations. Here we study a nonstudent population to see if the relationship between altruism and participation generalizes.
Moreover, unlike previous studies, we use both self-reported and validated turnout to tie behavior in the dictator game to participation in political life.
Our study contributes to existing literature first by establishing the criterion validity of allocations in the dictator game; we show that a dictator game allocation can be understood as a measure of altruism because it predicts support for humanitarian norms and charitable contributions to Hurricane Katrina victims. Second, we establish that the positive relationship between dictator game giving and political participation exists in a nonstudent population, providing evidence to support the generalizability of previous results for students to a general population. Third, we show that the link between altruism and political life can depend upon how political stakes are framed. When electoral issues are framed as distributive contests, where costs are merely shifted from one party to another and where there is no clear way to connect political activity with making everyone better off, altruists participate no more than egoists.
ALTRUISM AND PARTICIPATION
The capacity for altruism is widespread in humans. Altruistic motivation, that is, the intention to benefit others even at risk to personal welfare (Monroe 1998) , can be observed in a wide range of contexts (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Monroe 1998; Piliavin and Charng 1990) .
A distinguishing characteristic of altruistic behavior is that altruistic individuals do not generally restrict their altruistic actions to those that will benefit specific groups; altruists tend to identify with humanity generally rather than any specific subgroup (Monroe 1998) . This undeniable capacity for altruistic action, we argue, is a critical component of the calculus of participation and is missing in traditional self-interested models.
Models of participation assuming only instrumental self-interest posit that individuals are expected to participate in order to secure a benefit, B, if their preferred outcome is realized.
However, the probability, P, that a given individual will affect an outcome is generally extremely small. Thus, it is typically the case that the individual cost, C, of participating (e.g., time and effort) is greater than the expected benefit of voting: C > PB. In this typical case, rational and purely self-interested individuals will not vote; clearly, this prediction contradicts the observed phenomena of large scale turnout. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) proposed a modification of this calculus by introducing a D term to capture the benefit to the self of fulfilling one's personal "duty." This approach specifies that individuals gain utility through the expressive act of participation. In this model, the participatory is not instrumental; that is, utility derived from fulfilling a duty is unrelated to the policy outcome and the benefits it might import.
We argue that the policy outcomes of political actions do affect individual decisionmaking. A growing number of scholars (Dawes and Fowler 2007; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Feddersen and Sandroni 2006; Fowler 2006; Fowler and Kam 2007; Jankowski 2002; Jankowski 2004 ) are explicitly including in the calculus of participation the argument that an individual cares about the impact of policies on others as well as themselves. Although a single participatory act may have little effect on a political outcome, the number of people who benefit may be quite large. Thus, those who exhibit a sufficient degree of concern for the welfare of others may be willing to engage in costly political participation. Moreover, as people become more concerned for the welfare of others, they should experience greater benefits when political outcomes portend improvements for the welfare of others generally. Thus, altruists will be more likely to participate than individuals who are self-interested.
Note, however, this effect is contextual. We argue that political outcomes can have two effects: (1) they can change the average level of welfare of members of the polity, and/or (2) they can favor particular social and political groups, transferring resources from one part of the society to the other. When altruists believe outcomes affect the average level of welfare in the society, they may believe their actions have the potential to make a large group of individuals better off. Under these conditions we expect altruists to participate more than egoists. However, when they believe that political outcomes have no effect on net welfare and are merely redistributive, then they may believe their actions will make some better off at the same time they make others worse off. Consequently, under these conditions we do not expect to see a distinction between altruists and egoists. Thus, the connection between altruism and political participation may depend upon how the outcomes of political contests are understood.
FINDING ALTRUISTS AMONG DICTATORS
Our study contributes to existing empirical work by adopting an innovative measure of altruism and expanding the population of study beyond convenience samples of undergraduates.
Previous attempts to examine the relationship between other-regarding behavior and participation have relied on questions in the National Election Study (NES) pilots. Knack (1992) creates an index of "social altruism" from questions about charity, volunteer work, and community involvement on the 1991 NES Pilot Study and finds a positive relationship between the index and voter turnout. However, the questions used in the index are very close to those used by scholars who argue that organizational involvement (not altruism) enhances political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . Jankowski (2004) finds a relationship between voter turnout and "humanitarian" norms from questions on the 1995 NES Pilot Study.
For example, turnout correlates with answers to the question "One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others." These questions certainly reflect expectations about the altruism of others, but it is not clear how they relate to the respondent's own willingness to bear costs to provide benefits to others.
While the findings in Knack (1992) and Jankowski (2004) are supportive of the relationship between altruism and political participation, they both rely on respondents' expressed preferences for helping others. In neither case do respondents actually experience a cost in order to give a benefit to someone else. In contrast, preferences for helping others are revealed in what experimental economists call the "dictator game" (Forsythe et al. 1994) . In this game, the experimenter gives player 1 a certain amount of money and then asks the subject to divide that money between herself and player 2.
If player 1 is motivated only by her own economic gain, she should keep all the money for herself and allocate nothing to player 2. However, this is not what players normally do. In a survey of dictator game results, Camerer (2003) shows that the mean allocation to player 2 ranges from 10% to 52%. Anonymity conditions tend to decrease the mean allocation, but even in the most anonymous treatments (Hoffman et al. 1994 ) about 40% of the allocations still exceed 0.
Nearly all dictator games are played among students (Camerer 2003) . One exception to this rule is work by Henrich and colleagues, where they have taken the dictator game (and other games from experimental economics) to the vast reaches of the globe (Henrich, et al. 2004 ).
They find that while students from different cultures seem to play these games in similar ways, nonstudent behaviors differ significantly across cultures. In particular, mean allocations to the anonymous recipient tend to be higher in cultures that have market economies. Our study provides us with an opportunity to contribute to knowledge in this domain, by identifying
whether and to what extent differences in dictator game behaviors emerge across students and nonstudents in the United States.
Subjects in our study consist of 112 non-student citizens residing in XXXX County, XX.
These individuals were recruited at Farmers' Markets and grocery stores in XXXXX and an adjoining town, from February through May of 2006. The sampling frame was restricted to individuals over the age of 18 with a permanent residence in XXXX County. Upon approaching the booth, potential subjects were asked if they were residents of XXXX County. They were asked to provide a name, and the researcher looked up the name to determine whether the individual had voted in the previous special election, was registered but did not vote in the previous special election, or was not registered to vote in XXXX County. The subject was classified as one of these three types, and assigned a subject identification number to indicate which "type" they were. These subject identification numbers were written in invisible ink and were unnoticeable from the subject's point of view. Only the researcher knew which "type" the individual was.
Subjects then received a folder containing a set of written instructions. First, they were instructed to play an anonymous version of the dictator game. Each subject received two opaque envelopes. One contained ten one-dollar bills, and the other was empty. They were instructed to decide how many one-dollar bills they would like to share with an anonymous individual and to put those one-dollar bills into the "small envelope." Subjects were told that their decisions were completely anonymous and that the anonymous recipient would never be able to find out the subject's identity. They were also informed that they would be returning the small envelope to a clear plastic box on display (it contained many, many envelopes). There was no identifying information of any kind on the small envelope (although the subject identification number was written in invisible ink on both the survey and the small envelope to link it to the subject's survey responses). The complete instructions appear in the Appendix. After playing the dictator game, subjects then completed a brief questionnaire. Each subject received $5 for participating in the study, in addition to whatever they chose to keep for themselves from the dictator game.
Subjects in this study were more heterogeneous than student samples we have used in previous work (citations omitted). They ranged in age from 23 to 82, with a mean age of 40.
About 58% of subjects were female; 75% were white. Despite the attempt to recruit from all walks of life, the subject pool reflects the fact that some recruitment occurred in a college town: 38% of our subjects had graduate degrees and 41% had bachelor's degrees. Figure 1 displays the distribution of dictator game behaviors among our sample. The distribution is trimodal -a bit out of the ordinary compared with previous research. Previous research has typically found modes at 0 and at 5, but not at 10 (Camerer 2003) . But, previous research has also almost exclusively relied on student samples. Hence, with this design, we reveal slightly different patterns of giving, using a nonstudent sample. Table 1 provides pairwise correlations between dictator game behaviors and demographics available in the questionnaire. We see that only two correlations are statistically distinguishable from zero: women give more than men (which is consistent with existing literature -Eckel and Grossman 1998). Additionally, individuals with higher incomes give more than individuals with lower incomes (which contradicts findings in student populations where high income individuals tend to give less -Carpenter, Verhoogen, and Burks 2005).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

BUT IS IT REALLY ALTRUISM?
Excess giving in dictator games is a replicable empirical regularity. Scholars offer several explanations for this excess, including reciprocity, social desirability, and fairness. On the notion of reciprocity, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) argue that excess giving occurs in order to satisfy norms of reciprocity.
Dictators give to others because future rewards are contingent upon the individual's "social reputation as a cooperative other-regarding person" (Smith 2000, 84) . Dictators thus give more than would be expected because they are concerned that appearing "greedy" will decrease the likelihood that they would be invited back for more experiments, or they are concerned with other negative consequences for themselves. To dispute this reciprocity argument, Johannesson and Persson (2000) manipulate the target recipient in a dictator game, specifying that the recipient is one of the other subjects recruited for the study or a randomly selected individual from the general population. They argue that, "If donations in dictator games are motivated solely by reciprocity, donations should therefore drop to zero with this experimental treatment" (138). Johannesson and Persson are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the two groups, which suggests that excess giving in the dictator game cannot be ascribed to reciprocity on its own.
We designed our study with this concern in mind. Subjects were explicitly told that the recipient would be an anonymous individual in a given city. Subjects were also told that their donations were anonymous and that the anonymous individual would never know their identity.
Further, subjects completed the dictator game behind a screened in table, and they dropped their small envelopes into a clear box that also contained a pile of other small unmarked envelopes.
They were completely unaware that we would be able to link back their behavior in the dictator game with their individual-level survey responses by using invisible ink.
Another explanation for excess giving is that subjects do not understand the game and are just making random allocations. Andreoni and Miller (2002) address this concern by examining within-subject patterns of choices in their series of dictator games with different payoffs. They find that 98% of the subjects make choices that are consistent with the general axiom of revealed preferences across eight treatments, suggesting that most of them understand the game and are not choosing randomly.
These results from the literature on giving in the dictator game indicate that, while several factors that might explain giving, dictator game allocations may be a good proxy for individual altruism. The well-being of others is probably more important to a person who chooses to give $2 than one who gives $0. In fact, the utility function used in Andreoni and Miller (2002) to explain behavior in the dictator game yields a monotonic relationship between the equilibrium allocation in the dictator game and the weight a player places on the other player's utility. In other words, the more a player cares about the well-being of others, the more she will allocate to the other player in the dictator game.
The altruism explanation suggests that dictators give to others because they want to improve the well-being of other individuals, even when doing so impinges on their own material interests. In his thorough overview of dictator games, Camerer (2003) notes that "there is some pure altruism" that explains excess giving (56). For example, Eckel and Grossman (1996) manipulate the target of dictator games to ascertain the role that altruism might play in these games; they find that subjects are much more likely to give when the target is the Red Cross.
Eckel and Grossman infer from this finding that "altruism is a motivating factor in human behavior in general and in dictator games in particular" (182).
For our part, we included a set of questions to improve our ability to ascertain whether dictator game allocations can be understood as acts of altruism. Each of these questions is phrased very generally to enable us to establish criterion validity: that our measure of altruism correlates with what it should theoretically be related to. 1 We constructed an additive scale based on responses to four items that represent humanitarianism, which Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) define as "the belief that people have responsibilities toward their fellow human beings and should come to the assistance of others in need" (659). The four items are:
"One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself." "It is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needs." (R) "A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others." "People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should." (R)
Where (R) indicates that these variables have been reverse coded in scale construction
Dictator game behaviors and the humanitarianism scale correlate positively, at 0.285, and in both bivariate and multiple regression, dictator game behaviors significantly predict selfreported humanitarianism scores. 2 The regression results appear in Table 2.   TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE As a second test, we expected altruism to be correlated with responses to humanitarian crises. In our questionnaire, we asked respondents if they had made a personal contribution for Hurricane Katrina relief, if they were considering making one, or if they were not considering making one at this time. 3 The ordered probit regressions appear in Table 2 as well. The results suggest that people who gave more in the dictator game were more likely to have made a contribution for Hurricane Katrina relief (or to have considered giving) than those who kept more to themselves.
These two sets of analyses suggest that our altruism measure is, indeed, correlated with what we theoretically believe it should be related to. If altruism consists of a concern for others'
well-being, then the humanitarianism scale provides one standard against which we can probe the criterion validity of dictator game behaviors. Dictator game behaviors are correlated with responses to these four questions, and they significantly predict endorsement of humanitarian 2 The scale ranges from 0 (least humanitarian) to 1 (most humanitarian), with a mean of 0.78, standard deviation of 0.17, and Cronbach's α = 0.73. 
ALTRUISM & POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Our next intention is to establish a baseline relationship between altruism and political participation. This work contributes to existing literature because few studies have analyzed dictator game behaviors as covariates to predict political participation. The studies that do identify a relationship between dictator game behaviors and voting (Fowler 2006) or participation more generally (Dawes and Fowler 2007; Fowler and Kam 2007) rely primarily on student samples. While results based on student samples may replicate in nonstudent samples, empirical evidence one way or the other is hard to find. 4 This paper provides such evidence.
Our dependent variable consists of an additive scale of nine political acts. These political acts include both electoral (contributions, campaign work), governmental (contacted a public official; participated in a non-work-related protest; contributed to a political organization; been a member of a political organization), and community (local board; attended local meetings;
worked with others in the community) participation.
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Subjects are asked to indicate any acts that they have participated in, within the past two years. We begin with a simple model that regresses political participation on altruism, and then we add a series of control variables commonly found in the literature on political participation (see, e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Table 3 demonstrate, our measure of altruism strongly predicts political participation. This effect is substantial in the bivariate case and withstands the inclusion of control variables. In substantive terms, an otherwise "average" individual who keeps all of the ten-dollar bills to herself has a 0.32 predicted probability of participating in none or only one act. 6 Her altruistic counterpart who donated all ten-dollar bills to the anonymous individual has a predicted probability of 0.09 of participating in none or only one political act. As another interpretation, we can calculate the expected number of acts, given the predicted probability of completing a certain number of acts. A pure egoist will complete an expected 2.71 political acts, whereas a purely altruistic individual will complete double the number of acts: 4.47. 7 In other words, altruism doubles the extent to which an otherwise "average" individual in our sample participates in political life.
Our findings suggest that the positive relationship between political participation and altruism, as measured through dictator game behaviors, holds beyond the "narrow database" (Sears 1986 ) of student samples. With this sample of nonstudent adults, we find that altruism significantly predicts political participation across an array of acts.
6 Age, income, and religious attendance are set to the sample mean. Sex, race, strength of partisanship, and education are set to the sample mode. refers to the number acts performed and p(x m ) refers to the predicted probability of completing a certain number of acts.
ALTRUISM, TURNOUT, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
So far we have demonstrated that altruism predicts participation across a wide-ranging series of acts, where individuals are reporting on past behavior within the last two years. We have contributed to existing research by demonstrating that findings derived from student samples replicate handily in a non-student sample. We designed an aspect of our study to enable us to gain purchase on an additional research question, one that focuses on the extent to which features of political life resonate or repulse altruists and egoists.
To do so, we took advantage of an unusual election. Recall that when subjects approached the booth to participate in our study, the researcher identified their turnout status in the November 2005 special election held in the state of XXXX. Each subject was assigned a subject identification number that indicated whether they had voted, were registered but had not voted, or were not listed on the country voting rolls. While the special election featured some state-wide ballot propositions (each of which failed, most by a landslide) and a local school board election, the centerpiece of the election was a local ballot proposition called Measure X.
In the city of XXXX, turnout on Measure X was quite high for an off-year election: 60.7%, though comparable to the turnout in the Oct 2003 California Recall election (68%) and comparable to turnout in the 2002 midterm elections (61%). Measure X asked voters to determine whether a parcel of farmland should be rezoned for residential and commercial use. Developers proposed to build just under 2,000 residential units 8 For anonymity purposes, the specific subject identification number was never attached to an identifying name. Instead, subjects were assigned ID numbers in the 100 series (e.g., 101, 102, etc.) if the county listed them as having voted in the 2005 November special election; in the 200 series if the county listed them as registered but not having voted; and in the 300 series if they were not listed on the rolls. In hindsight, had we attached an identifying tag between the subject's name and the ID number, we would have been able to validate voting behavior in previous elections. However, unfortunately, our design does not enable us to go beyond the November 2005 special election to validate voting history. and a set of shopping centers on a 400 acre plot of land. Measure X was a serious and highly divisive political issue. It received front-page lead story attention in the town's local paper nearly every day in November leading up to the election, as well as five days in October and four days in September. It was the single most expensive political campaign ever run in the city of XXXX (XXXX Enterprise, 11/2/05). It generated far more letters to the editor than any other issue at stake in the election: in the week preceding the election, excerpts from 95 letters just on Measure X were printed in the paper.
Measure X supporters and opponents lobbed an array of arguments back and forth; most of these focused on who would stand to gain and who would stand to lose as a consequence of the proposed development. One central concern in the city of XXXX is affordable housing: the median home price at the time was $540,000. Supporters of Measure X pointed out that at least one percent of the developed homes would be affordable housing units (which would be available at a rate of fourteen units per year, over the course of ten years). Opponents of Measure X countered that any affordable housing units would be dominated by large, milliondollar homes. The local paper's most prominent columnist and political pundit noted that even if affordable housing units were made available in the new development, "the average $667,000 XXXX homeowner is scared to death that a home comparable to his may be built …for $400,000" (XXXX Enterprise, 11/8/05). The columnist went on to point out that the more affordable the units in the new development were, "the more homeowners will vote against the project and the more renters will vote in favor…" (XXXX Enterprise, 11/8/05). On balance, the city's assessment of Measure X was that the impact of the developed housing was "fiscally neutral" (XXXX Enterprise, 9/21/05), and the City's Financial Director was paraphrased as advising voters to evaluate the project "for its amenities rather than what it might do to the city budget" (XXXX Enterprise, 10/5/05). In other words, there was no consensus on whether voting for or against Measure X would produce a societal benefit.
Another issue of contention concerned the environmental impacts of the proposed housing development. Supporters of Measure X argued that the environmental impacts would be mitigated in various ways, for example, through the use of solar energy in the developed homes, the protection of wetlands, the construction of bike paths to minimize car use; the key designer of the Measure X project had received Sierra Club endorsement and international acclaim for the environmentally friendly design of a prior, smaller-scale project in the 1970s. Opponents argued that the environmental impacts were negative due to worsened air quality and increased traffic experienced by those living near the proposed development; further, the local Sierra Club took a stand against Measure X. Strong arguments existed on both sides, and there was no clear sense of whether Measure X would hurt or harm the environment.
A key campaign event occurred one month prior to the election, when Trader Joe's, a well-known West-Coast based specialty food store, announced it would set up shop in the proposed development. Homes in the town were blanketed with wine-bottle-shaped flyers proclaiming that Trader Joe's was coming to XXXX. The city had been courting the food store for several years, to no avail. The local paper's most prominent columnist wryly remarked: "Here comes Trader Joe's … no, I am not making this up… but yes, there is a catch… the catch is, if you want a Trader Joe's in XXXX, you have to vote "YES" on Measure X" (XXXX Enterprise, 10/6/05). Another element to the Measure X campaign, then, was a promise of clear benefits for the self-interested (foodies obsessed with Trader Joe's) in the town. This, too, makes the stakes of Measure X quite distinct from typical political contests.
The campaigns for and against Measure X fought over who would stand to gain and who would stand to lose. Many of the gains would be experienced by people who eventually might be candidates for residing in the proposed development; many of the losses would be experienced by people living near the proposed development. Nearly every argument about potential benefits to the public was countered; as one local columnist summarized: "[Measure X] is a very mixed bag" (XXXX Enterprise, 10/25/05). Much of the debate was distributive in nature: about how the proposed development would shift benefits to some individuals at a cost borne by others. The League of Women Voters, which took a public position on all of the statewide propositions and has regularly endorsed national, state, and local candidates, publicly stated that it took no position on Measure X. The local Audubon Society, similarly, publicly stated that it took no position on Measure X. Additionally, the campaign included key themes that would trigger self-interested considerations. The fact that a "Yes" vote would open the door to Trader Joe's locating in town provided a clear opportunity for individuals to translate selfinterested preferences into their decision of whether and how to vote. And, the specter of more affordable housing highlighted different costs and benefits for homeowners and renters. As a local political pundit predicted: "There is a large, very silent group of voters who are thinking with their pocket books. No one will admit to such a selfish motive, but trust me, it's out there.
The size of this voting bloc will determine whether Measure X passes or fails" (XXXX Enterprise, 10/19/05). In the end, voters overwhelmingly rejected Measure X, with 41.2% of voters supporting it and 58.7% opposing it.
We are interested in whether the core finding that altruists participate more in political life than egoists holds within a divisive, distributive political context drenched with selfinterested appeals such as the one surrounding Measure X. We suspected the answer would be no, since the political stakes were framed in such starkly resdistributive, egoistic ways. To identify the effect of altruism on voter turnout in this election we estimate a model using validated vote as the dependent variable, where a value of one indicates validated turnout in the November 2005 special election, and 0 indicates all others. These results appear in Table 4 .
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
We see that in the bivariate regression, altruism is not a significant predictor of validated vote. After including a series of controls, altruism is still not a significant predictor of validated vote. To determine if our results were a function of how we coded the dependent variable, we re-estimated the relationship between turnout and altruism, using two alternative codings of the dependent variable. Recall that the first version assigns a value of one to all subjects whose vote could be validated and a value of zero to all others. In the next version of the dependent variable, we used a trichotomous categorization: 0 if not registered (and thus did not vote); .5 if registered but did not vote; 1 if registered and voted. These results appear in the second set of values in Table 4 . Still, altruism in the bivariate model fails to significantly predict turnout, and continues to fail to predict turnout in the presence of control variables. Next, we recoded the dependent variable to a value of 0 if registered but did not vote, 1 if registered and voted, with all others dropped from the analysis, on the idea that we might want to examine the propensity to vote among those who already were registered. These results appear in the third set of estimates, and still, altruism fails to predict turnout. Finally, we included a self-reported measure of turnout. We assign a value of 1 to those who are "sure" they voted, and a value of 0 to all others.
These model estimates appear in the fourth set of results, and, altruism continues to be an insignificant predictor of turnout. If our altruism measure were solely a function of social desirability, then we would have expected to see a strong and significant relationship between dictator game behavior and self-reported turnout. This, however, is not the case. While the relationship is positive, it is not distinguishable from zero.
Notice, too, that we have a hard time predicting voter turnout using these models. All of the bivariate models are insignificant (judging by the p-value on the χ 2 test). However, the addition of individual-level covariates such as age, religious attendance, and partisanship significantly contributes to explaining variation in the dependent variable, across most of the models. This suggests that lack of power is not the issue.
What's the difference? Why does altruism fail to distinguish voters from nonvoters in this special election? We believe there are two possible explanations. The first is that the tenor of the campaign disillusioned and dismayed altruists, turning them away from participating in the election, while it simultaneously drew in egoists. The second explanation is that altruists participated at the "normal" level, but egoists turned out at an unusually high rate.
Our data suggests some gentle support for the first interpretation. The average level of altruism among non-registered subjects is 0.35; whereas the average altruism among registered subjects (regardless of whether they turned out in the election) is 0.43. This difference, while not statistically distinguishable from zero, is consistent with our initial story about altruism and participation in political life in general, altruists are more prepared to participate in political life.
However, among those who were registered to vote, the average level of altruism among those who stayed home was 0.46, whereas the average altruism among those who turned out in the special election was 0.42. These small differences, combined with our small sample size, make any statistical conclusions impossible; however, the data are suggestive in this regard. What these results indicate is that although altruism may provide a general propensity to participate in political life, the nature of political debate may attenuate this relationship.
CONCLUSION
We began this enterprise with an interest in identifying ways that political participation might be considered instrumental. We did so by considering the possibility that individuals incorporate non-self-interested incentives into their decisions about whether to participate in political life. Our altruism theory suggests that individuals gain utility by providing benefits to others, even when it is personally costly.
We have gone beyond existing research by testing the criterion validity of dictator game behaviors. We have shown that dictator game behaviors correlate well with humanitarian norms and charitable contributions, suggesting that dictator game behaviors may, indeed, tap altruism, which we conceptualize as an interest in the welfare of others, combined with a willingness to bear personal costs to improve the welfare of others. We extend previous research, too, by observing dictator game behaviors among a nonstudent sample and by showing that the findings reported elsewhere regarding the relationship between altruism and political participation replicate beyond student subjects to nonstudents. Altruism, that is, how people play the dictator game, predicts participation across a variety of acts.
Finally, we extend existing work by suggesting that the effect of altruism might be contingent upon circumstance. By situating our research within an actual political contest, we suggest that in political contests where the stakes are distributive and where it is not clear that either political outcome will garner a net gain to society, altruism does not predict turnout.
These results hold whether we use a validated vote measure or a self-reported vote measure.
Altruism is likely to have broader applications beyond political participation, and our innovative measures might serve other researchers' purposes in this regard. At a very general level, altruism might have implications for individuals' understandings of politics and subsequent beliefs about political processes. Altruists may see politics as a forum for the production of policies to improve the public good, and thus they might favor political processes that foster wide participation and dialogue. Altruists may oppose policies that are targeted at specific groups and instead favor policies that are more generally applied, much as humanitarians might (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) . We encourage scholars to extend this line of inquiry to investigate how other features of political life (like specific types of political campaign appeals) may draw in or repel altruists. These are, we think, important and critical extensions to a line of research that takes seriously the possibility that when some individuals contemplate participation in political life, they encounter and embrace the notion that political participation is valuable not because of the benefits it promises to the self, but because of the benefits it portends for others.
That is, when it comes to political life, "It's not all about me." In the envelope with these instructions you will find ten $1 bills. You must choose how to divide the ten $1 bills between yourself and an anonymous individual. You may keep all, none, or some of the money-the decision is up to you and will be completely anonymous. You will never be able to find out the identity of the anonymous individual, and the anonymous individual will never be able to find out your identity.
TABLES
If you choose to share some $1 bills, take that number of $1 bills and put them back in the small envelope. We will then mail any money that is in the small envelope to a randomly selected individual in the city of Woodland.
Please seal the small envelope once you have finished.
Once you have sealed the small envelope with any money you may have chosen to share, please answer the enclosed survey.
After you are finished answering the enclosed survey, • Please seal the survey in the large envelope.
• You will place the small envelope in the clear locked box held by the researcher. This box will not be unlocked until the end of the survey, so we will not be able to identify you with your decisions or survey responses.
• Please return the survey sealed in the large envelope to the researcher.
Thank you very much for your time. In the past two years, have you worked as a volunteer-that is, for no pay at all or for only a token amount-for a candidate running for national, state, or local office? In the past two years have you contributed money-to an individual candidate, a political party, a political action committee, or any other organization that supports candidates or ballot propositions in elections? In the past two years, have you served in a voluntary capacity-that is, for no pay at all or for only a token amount-on any local governmental board or council that deals with community problems and issues such as a town council, a school board, a zoning board, a planning board, or the like? In the past two years have you regularly attended meetings of an official local government board or council? In the past two years, aside from membership on a board or council or attendance at meetings, have you informally gotten together with or worked with others in your community or neighborhood to try to deal with some community problem? In the past two years, aside from contacts made as a regular part of your job, have you telephoned, written a letter to, or visited a government official to express your views on a public issue? In the past two years, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue (other than a strike against your employer)? In the past two years, not counting membership dues, have you given money to any organizations that take stands on any public issues-either locally or nationally? In the past two years, have you been a member of any organizations that take stands on any public issues-either locally or nationally? Additive scale ranging from 0 (No Acts) to 9 (All nine acts) Self-Reported Turnout: In talking to people about elections, we find that they are sometimes not able to vote because they're sick, they're not registered, they don't have the time, or they have difficulty getting to the polls. Did you happen to vote in the November 2005 special election? (Response Options: I did not vote / I thought about voting this time -but didn't / I usually vote, but I didn't this time/ I am sure I voted)
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